Post-Fed Gains Evaporate With Oracle Earnings

Yesterday was one of those days the kneejerk reaction to a Federal Reserve (Fed) decision didn’t make perfect sense. As widely anticipated, the Fed lowered interest rates by 25bp and the dot plot printed that the median expectation for next year was just one rate cut – unchanged from the latest dot plot.

But the median forecast is losing its relevance with the growing opinion – and political – divergence at the heart of the FOMC. Yesterday’s vote already was subject to 3 dissents: 2 voting members preferred keeping rates steady, while Stephan Miran – who was appointed by Trump himself with the mission of ‘cut, cut, cut’ – opted for a 50bp cut. Beyond the official vote, more regional Fed members showed reluctance to cut rates when inflation is just below the 3% level, with looming upside risks. Overall, 6 out of 19 Fed members didn’t agree with the Fed’s decision to cut by 25bp. And most of them preferred keeping rates unchanged – and wait until at least an updated CPI print to guide them. Miran was the only person pushing for a jumbo rate cut (Surprise!)

And oh, Donald Trump said that yesterday’s cut could’ve been higher, and will probably announce his next Fed Chair pick soon enough to inject more dovish members into the mix – to make sure that the Fed cuts, cuts, cuts.

So, the market reaction to such a crowded and undecided Fed was unusually positive. Treasuries and equities rallied. The US 2-year yield fell close to 3.50%, the 10-year yield retreated to 4.12%, the S&P500 gained, but the small-cap index outperformed with a 1.32% rally to a fresh ATH. The US dollar fell below a critical Fibonacci level – the 38.2% retracement on the fall–rebound – and is now back in the medium-term bearish consolidation zone, while gold gained and silver rallied to a fresh record high on softer US dollar and softer yields that reduce the opportunity cost of holding the non-interest-bearing metals.

For next year, the Fed will probably sit and wait for at least 6 months whoever takes the helm from Powell. The next cut from the Fed is not expected before June next year, and money markets continue to price in two rate cuts in 2026. But the divergence of opinion at the heart of the FOMC will probably get worse as politics influence some members’ decisions grandly. Respect and credibility regarding the Fed will be put to a tough test, and some decisions will make more political sense than economic.

This is terrible news. It probably makes sense to continue to reduce exposure to the US dollar.

Now, coming back to the market reaction, I rubbed my eyes a few times with unbelief seeing the positive reaction of equity markets to the Fed decision. I think there was little to cheer in that chaos. Consequently, it didn’t take much for the post-Fed optimism to evaporate with Oracle earnings.

Oracle announced a higher-than-expected EPS growth – but that was due to a one-time income from the sale of a subsidiary. Cloud sales increased 34% – but were lower than expected. Revenue from its infrastructure business grew 68% – also lower than expected by analysts. And more dramatically, the company continued to burn cash last quarter: its free cash flow reached a negative $10 billion. To make matters worse, the company said that it expects capex to reach about $50 billion in the fiscal year ending May 2026 – $15 billion more than its September forecast – and investments at Oracle are financed by debt: overall, the company has about $106 billion in debt. Frankly, the report was not dramatically bad, but it came to confirm concerns around heavy AI spending, financed by debt, with an unknown timeline for revenue generation, sending Oracle shares down by more than 11% in after-hours trading.

As such, Asia woke up to a bleak day. SoftBank lost more than 7% – the kind of moves that we’re now used to seeing in its stock price – while the tech-heavy Korean Kospi is under pressure, as national chip champion SK Hynix gives back more than 2.50% after the country’s main exchange issued a warning that the stock price had gone too high – following a nearly 300% jump between April and November – suggesting that we could be entering a bubble zone. Perhaps.

US futures are down this morning with Nasdaq leading losses. The Fed outlook looks dodgy. Worries regarding leveraged AI investments are taking centre stage. The FOMO of the AI rally is now turning into a fear of a bubble. Stock valuations are high and market breadth is quite narrow, with most of the gains and appetite relying on AI. It’s reasonable to expect a correction as fundamentals are moving away from the reality on the ground. Capital markets are turning into a big betting ground, and valuations make little sense. But go tell that to investors. The market rally is so sweet that there seems to be a collective understanding that if no one sells, the rally could simply go on. So let’s see whether anything could shake the omertà!

Good news is, the next big news of the week – Broadcom earnings – looks safer from a risk perspective. The company is expected to deliver another strong quarter, with consensus calling for roughly +30–32% year-over-year EPS growth, and ~24% annual revenue growth – driven by robust demand in custom AI silicon and networking products. Guidance on AI-related revenue and future demand trends will probably be solid as well, given that they are involved in the production of Google’s TPUs – which are expected to become a new hot commodity for those looking for cheaper alternatives to Nvidia’s GPUs for running AI applications, especially inference – expected to make up a big chunk of future AI computation.

And given how markets are willing to pull Santa into year-end – despite political, geopolitical and economic worries – good news from Broadcom could easily turn sentiment positive.

A Not-So-Hawkish Fed Cut – We Maintain Our Call

In focus today

In Norway, the Regional Survey is due for release. We expect it to confirm that growth continues to rise at a moderate pace, with capacity utilization largely unchanged and indicate that the level of activity is somewhat below normal. Specifically, we expect that respondents in the survey will expect 0.3-0.4% growth next quarter, that capacity utilization will be unchanged at 35% and that the number of companies experiencing labour shortages will fall from 25% to 24%.

In Sweden, the final figures for November inflation are being published. The preliminary figures surprised to the downside, with CPI at 0.3% y/y, CPIF 2.3% y/y, and CPIF ex. energy 2.4% y/y. As preliminary estimates are generally reliable, significant revisions are unlikely. It will be interesting to analyse the details to understand the factors behind the surprise. Specifically, whether the low outcome is linked to seasonal variations or other underlying causes.

In central bank space, attention turns to the Swiss National Bank, where we forecast the rate to remain unchanged at 0.00%. The Central Bank of Turkey is also set to release its rate decision.

Economic and market news

What happened yesterday

In the US, the Federal Reserve cut its policy rate target by 25bp to 3.50-3.75% last night, as widely anticipated. Miran voted for a larger 50bp cut, while Schmid and Goolsbee dissented in favour of a hold, also in line with our expectations. We (and the markets) had expected Powell to push back against market pricing further rate cuts for 2026. However, his avoidance of strong forward guidance led to a decline in UST yields and broad USD weakening during the press conference. We maintain our Fed call and expect two final rate cuts in March and June. The Fed also announced reserve management purchases of T-bills starting 12 December at USD 40bn per month, indicating more front-loaded easing to liquidity policies than we anticipated.

Ahead of the meeting, the US Q3 Employment Cost Index signalled slightly slower-than-expected wage growth at 0.8% q/q (prior: 1.0%). This pace is close to ideal for the Fed – supporting consumption without driving inflation – and is positive for overall risk sentiment.

In Sweden, October economic activity data showed a slight decline, with lower production in the business sector as well as declining household consumption. The GDP indicator fell by 0.3% m/m, though its volatility warrants cautious interpretation. Overall, the data aligned with our expectations of slower growth for Q4, reflecting lagged effects of the summer slowdown, and does not alter the positive outlook heading into 2026.

In Norway, November core inflation declined to 3.0% y/y (cons: 3.1%, prior: 3.0%), driven by domestic and imported goods ex. food. Annual growth in household appliances and electronics dropped close to September levels, indicating that volatility was likely influenced by Black week adjustments. The print is marginally lower than Norges Bank’s estimate from the September MPR at 3.1%, reinforcing the disinflationary trend. While this is unlikely to affect Norges Bank’s rate path next week, it provides scope for signalling a more aggressive cutting cycle, dependent on the Regional Network survey today.

In Canada, the Bank of Canada kept the rate unchanged at 2.25% as widely expected.

In Denmark, November inflation held steady at 2.1% y/y. Food prices declined 0.9% from October, which could potentially have a positive impact on consumer sentiment.

Equities: Equity investors cheered the not-so-hawkish Fed cut yesterday. S&P 500 jumped 1% at the press conference, eventually closing 0.7% higher and small cap Russell 2000 1.3% higher. The rate decision triggered a clear cyclical preference in markets: Value cyclicals like materials, industrials, and consumer discretionary were all ~2% higher. This is interesting. Previously this year we have seen cyclical growth stocks – mag 7, basically – rallying at dovish surprises. This time, it was more of a “run it hot” reaction in markets, where expectations of stronger macro fuelled the move higher rather than lower yields. This fits our narrative very well.

One sector worth highlighting is health care, performing very strong in the risk-on session yesterday. This is a bit odd in a historical context, but health care has been behaving like a cyclical sector in recent trading. This has certainly been a tremendous rally, but we take profits today and neutralize our health care sector call. Reason for this is that the positive health care call has been a valuation call, and this argument has rapidly changed. The relative discount has gone from 20% to 10% vs global markets the last three months, which we think is a fair discount at this part of the cycle. For instance, health care now trades close to the multiple of consumer staples, after a 20% discount at the bottom.

FI and FX: Yesterday’s Fed rate cut was a rather balanced one, but given that markets expected a hawkish cut, market reactions were slightly to the soft side. Rates rallied somewhat and the USD weakened a tad with EUR/USD trading at 1.169. Only tiny and transitory, negative reactions in EUR/SEK and EUR/NOK following the FOMC decision. Ahead of the Fed rate decision European rates rose once again, resulting in the fifth consecutive day of higher rates. Potential rate cuts for the ECB have by now been eliminated for 2026. This morning, EUR/SEK is back at 10.84 and EUR/NOK trades at 11.83.

FOMC Perceive Their Goals to be Within Reach, But Risks Remain

The FOMC is optimistic on growth and inflation. Westpac sees uncertainty on both fronts.

The FOMC cut the fed funds rate by 25bps to a midpoint of 3.625% at their December meeting as the market had hoped. However, the Committee held to September’s projection of just one more cut in 2026 and another in 2027 to a broadly neutral rate of 3.125% by end-2027 compared to the market’s expectation for a return to neutral policy by end-2026.

Warranting a slow normalisation of policy, the FOMC now expects above-trend growth in 2027 (2.3% from 1.8% in September) and 2028 (2.0% from 1.9%), arguably because of support for consumption from real income growth and as the AI-related infrastructure build out continues. In the press conference, Chair Powell also noted that 0.2ppts of growth had been transferred from 2025 to 2026 because of late-2025’s Government shutdown. The unemployment rate profile is little changed, expected to grind lower to the full employment level of 4.2% in 2028.

The Committee showed little concern over the inflation outlook, with a measured descent in annual core inflation forecast from 3.0% in 2025 to 2.5% in 2026, then 2.1% in 2027 and 2.0% in 2028. In effect, moderately restrictive policy is expected to prove successful over time, allowing the FOMC to meet both sides of its mandate.

Westpac believes the US faces material capacity constraints across power, logistics and other essential services owing to a lack of breadth in business investment and given migration reform. We expect this constraint to hold activity growth around trend, versus the FOMC’s more optimistic view, and to result in greater persistence in inflation and associated risks.

Our forward view for the fed funds rate is consistent with the FOMC’s for 2026, with the cut most likely to come in early-2026 before inflation’s persistence becomes a concern. But thereafter we expect the Committee to remain on hold at 3.375% and for inflation risks to bias up long-term yields, along with growing fiscal uncertainty.

Why America Is Suddenly Slowing Down on Electric Vehicles

Electric vehicles were surging, until Washington abruptly hit the brakes. Now the US faces a precipice in its adoption curve. Will it recover or fall behind?

1. A Turning Point in US EV Policy

On 4 July 2025, the US crossed a policy Rubicon. Congress passed the One Big Beautiful Bill and President Trump signed it the same day, officially terminating the federal EV tax credits by 30 September 2025—a full seven years ahead of schedule.

Initiated under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in 2022, these credits, up to $7,500 for new EVs, $4,000 for used, and as much as $40,000 for commercial vehicles, were once hailed as a cornerstone of the clean transportation transition. Their removal marks a radical shift at a moment when electric mobility was just beginning to gain mass-market traction.

The administration claims the move will save the federal government $170 billion over the next decade. While fiscal prudence is understandable, the timing raises urgent questions about the future of emissions reductions, domestic EV manufacturing, and America’s competitive stance in the global clean technology race. These incentives were designed not only to lower upfront vehicle costs but also to catalyze industry investment, consumer adoption, and supply chain growth.

By pulling the plug so abruptly, the government risks destabilizing an industry still dependent on consistent policy signals to plan production and investments. This sudden withdrawal could discourage automakers and suppliers from expanding EV production capacity, potentially ceding technological leadership to international competitors.

As the nation halts its electric vehicle strategy, the broader implications remain as uncertain as they are consequential, creating a policy vacuum at a critical juncture for climate and industrial policy.

EV Share Over Time

Source: The Salata Institute, Harvard University

The rollback of the EV tax credits goes far beyond merely ending rebate checks, it represents a sweeping and systematic reversal of the federal strategy carefully constructed since 2022 to accelerate electric vehicle adoption. By 30 September, support for EV buyers will vanish entirely, cutting off incentives for both new and used electric vehicles that had previously qualified for credits up to $7,500 and $4,000, respectively.

Equally significant, commercial and leasing subsidies, some worth tens of thousands of dollars, have also been eliminated, sharply reducing the economic motivation for fleet electrification, a critical segment for scaling clean transport.

Infrastructure investment—a key pillar of the transition—is next to fall victim. The National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) program, originally funded with $5 billion under the 2021 Bipartisan Infrastructure Law to build fast-charging stations along highways at fifty-mile intervals, was abruptly halted by the administration in February.

This suspension, despite ongoing legal challenges from several states and a partial injunction restoring some funding, has created substantial uncertainty within the EV charging sector, delaying planned deployments and shaking the confidence of private investors and utility partners vital to expanding the national charging network.

Regulatory protections that underpin long-term emission reductions are also unravelling. Shortly after reinstating federal oversight, President Trump revoked California’s Clean Air Act waivers, using the Congressional Review Act to strip the state and its partners of the authority to enforce stricter emissions limits and zero-emission vehicle mandates.

Meanwhile, the administration has signaled intentions to revisit and potentially weaken national greenhouse gas and fuel economy standards for vehicles manufactured after 2027, though formal rulemaking has yet to be finalized.

Furthermore, the Inflation Reduction Act’s production tax credits for domestic battery and critical materials manufacturing are now under threat. These incentives had fueled new giga-factory construction and supply chain investments critical for scaling US-based EV production. Their rollback jeopardizes these investments and risks stalling the growth of a domestic manufacturing base essential for long-term competitiveness.

Taken together, these changes represent the most drastic reversal of US EV policy in over a decade, systematically dismantling what was once a multifaceted system of incentives, infrastructure investment, and regulatory guardrails designed to accelerate electrification, raising profound questions about the future trajectory of American clean transportation.

2. Short-Term Surge and Market Reactions

As federal EV subsidies near expiration on 30 September, dealers report large inventories and are aggressively cutting prices to spur last-minute sales. {{13994|Tesla (NASDAQ:)}} maintained strong Q2 volumes despite a 9% drop year-over-year, and GM hit a record 46,000 EV sales in the quarter. This short-term surge, driven by consumers rushing to claim rebates, masks a looming risk: without subsidies, price-sensitive buyers may hold back, causing a potential slump in mainstream EV adoption.

Investor reactions have been mixed. Pure-play EV companies like {{1179312|Rivian (NASDAQ:)}} and {{1166456|Lucid (NASDAQ:)}} saw stock gains: 4.6% and 8.8% respectively, thanks to continued eligibility for credits through leasing or battery sourcing rules. Tesla’s shares lagged, as its earnings rely heavily on emissions-credit revenue and consumer incentives now in jeopardy. Overall, while smaller EV makers may benefit initially, mass-market demand faces uncertainty as price premiums rise and promotional pushes fade.

Harvard’s Salata Institute modelled the impact of rolling back EV policies. Under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), EVs were expected to capture 48% of new vehicle sales by 2030. Removing just the consumer tax credits cuts this to 42%. When combined with halted infrastructure funding, weakened state mandates, and revoked emissions rules, adoption could drop further to roughly one-third of new sales.

This decline has direct environmental consequences. The rollback may add 20 to 44 million metric tons of CO₂ emissions in 2030, roughly equal to putting nearly ten million gasoline cars back on the road. The US Energy Department similarly forecasts a 2–3-year delay in reaching EV adoption milestones. These setbacks threaten domestic factory ramp-ups and broader industry momentum just as EVs approach mass-market viability.EV Share of New LDVs

Source: The Salata Institute, Harvard University

Yes, removing credits yields hard federal savings: around $168.5 billion over a decade. But that gain comes at a steep price: lost climate benefits, weakened supply chains, a painful geopolitical retreat, and crucially, significant equity concerns, as the most vulnerable consumers lose access to essential financial support.

The rollback also freezes $12 billion in NEVI spending, while shelving IRA battery production credits (45X) saves another $7 billion. Ironically, the California emissions waiver scrapping adds almost nothing to savings, but hurts EV targets. In sum, most financial savings come from a single move, the credit removal, but nearly every other aspect contributes heavily to climate and industrial fallout, raising the question: which consumers will slip through the cracks?

Not all buyers will be affected equally by the end of federal EV incentives. Lower‑ and middle‑income purchasers, key to achieving mass-market adoption, stand to lose the most, as they often relied on credits to bridge the price gap between electric and conventional vehicles. With average EV transaction prices still significantly above those of comparable gas-powered cars, subsidies were frequently the deciding factor in affordability.

At the other end of the spectrum, luxury EV buyers, such as those purchasing from brands like Rivian and Lucid, have more financial flexibility and continue to benefit from leasing structures and private discounts that can soften the impact of subsidy removal.

Automakers are responding with targeted dealer incentives, manufacturer rebates, and more aggressive lease programs. While these measures may help cushion the transition, they lack the scale and consistency of federal policy and are unlikely to fully offset the loss of broad-based subsidies.

State governments may attempt to fill the void, such as California and Massachusetts, whose strong political and fiscal support could maintain some EV incentives. Still, without a coordinated federal effort, the effectiveness of such measures will vary widely and likely leave lower-income communities at a disadvantage in many parts of the country.

At the same time, the IRA’s EV push had driven substantial factory investment including giga-factories, battery plants, and supply chain hubs in Republican districts. Now many stand on unstable footing.

Transport analyst forecasts suggest 40 to 60% of planned EV factories will be at risk if policy support evaporates. {{239|General Motors (NYSE:)}} and have already delayed or cancelled giga-factory plans, Tesla postponed its budget model plans, and even European and Asian competitors are recalibrating their US strategies amidst increased uncertainty. In effect, the US risks shrinking its EV manufacturing base just as global competitors accelerate.

Globally, EV adoption has soared: approaching 25% of new car sales in 2025. With China leading the charge, Europe aggressively enforcing quotas and subsidies, the US is veering off the main track.

China’s EV-led economic strategy, which includes concentrated supply chains, export ambitions, battery dominance, will benefit from weakened US competition. This could undo years of investment and mission-driven innovation across multiple sectors. If domestic policy bakes in subpar uptake, the US forfeits leadership, and all the jobs, IP, and influence that come with it.

EV Infrastructure

Source: Bloomberg NEF, Eco-Movement, China Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Promotion Alliance, various public and private sources

The rollback hits infrastructure hard. NEVI, which aimed to deliver fast chargers every 50 miles along interstates, is now paused. The result: rural America and renters in urban corridors remain without charging access. With range anxiety still a barrier, the lack of national charging infrastructure will reinforce urban-rural divides and limit where EVs can actually be used. This also threatens networks like Electrify America, which rely on policy support and usage scale.

The climate impact is equally stark. This move adds millions more tones of CO₂ to America’s 2030 emissions than projected. Electric vehicles, key to decarbonizing transport—currently the nation’s single largest source of emissions—will backslide. Climate goals become less attainable, climate adaptation more difficult, and emergency scenarios more likely.

Carbon Emissions

Source: The Salata Institute, Harvard University

What Happens Next (LON:): Looking Ahead

In the short term, a wave of EV purchases is expected as consumers rush to secure rebates before the deadline, supported by dealer discounts and promotions. However, once federal credits expire, demand are likely to fall sharply, settling at a lower baseline.

Automakers and dealerships plan to counter this gap with increased incentives and leasing deals, while some states may continue offering limited subsidies. Yet, these fragmented efforts cannot replace the nationwide reach or consistency of federal support, especially for price-sensitive buyers.

Globally, the US risks losing ground. China’s EV market continues to surge with strong government backing, while Europe tightens emissions standards and accelerates zero-emission vehicle mandates. Unless policies adjust, US may fall behind key competitors in EV adoption, manufacturing, and innovation.

Longer term, improvements in battery technology and more model availability could reignite growth by the mid-2030s. Still, the five-year gap created by this policy reversal represents not just a delay but lost opportunities in emissions reductions, supply chain development, and industrial leadership.

Outlook for EVs

Source: Bloomberg NEF

Conclusion: A True Fork in the Road

The “EV cliff” is now law. On 4 July 2025, President Trump signed the “One Big Beautiful Bill,” officially ending federal EV tax credits and gutting the backbone of US electric mobility policy. This isn’t just a rollback: it’s a rupture. Growth forecasts are being cut, emissions targets thrown off course, and factories now face dwindling demand.

The US will remain in the EV race, but no longer as a frontrunner. Global competitors will shape the next era of transport innovation while America risks falling behind. Some policy rebound may come, but not without cost. 4 July may still mark independence, but in 2025, it also marked the day America chose to stall its electric future. Whether it regains momentum depends on what happens next.

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Think Ahead: Why Central Banks Can’t Agree

After the Bank of England’s unprecedented split vote this week, James Smith asks: why can’t central banks just make their minds up on ? Interest rate expectations are set for a volatile ride, he argues, starting with Tuesday’s all-important US numbers. Here’s everything we’re looking for next week. Wasn’t summer supposed to be quiet?

Why Central Banks Can’t Agree

What do the UK and US economies have in common right now? Quite a lot, actually, when you think about it.

Both are likely to see inflation briefly rise to around 4% this year. Both have creaking jobs markets. Both have seen big revisions to the hiring numbers recently. And both have seen their growth outlooks sour amid mounting domestic policy uncertainty.

Why, then, are their respective central banks set to do wildly different things with interest rates this autumn? That’s the perception at least. Investors are pricing more than three US rate cuts by next easter, where barely one is priced in the UK.

Obviously, I’m simplifying things a bit. The UK isn’t waging a massive tariff war, nor is it installing known doves to its rate-setting committee.

Still, the stark differences between Federal Reserve and Bank of England expectations are hard to reconcile. One is likely to be wrong. And quite possibly both.

But how have we ended up in this situation? And why are there such unprecedented levels of disagreement among policymakers on the way forward? This week’s BoE decision yielded the first ever tied vote, while July’s Fed meeting saw two governors dissent for the first time in over 30 years.

I see three explanations:

One, now more than ever, it’s possible to reach wildly different interpretations from the economic data. In the UK, next week’s payroll data is likely to confirm that employment has fallen in eight out of the last nine months. Yet, redundancies haven’t risen at all. And surveys suggest hiring is essentially flat. The true picture is far from clear.

Data quality issues don’t help, a problem far from unique to the UK. Response rates to key surveys have fallen since Covid, and that’s partly why we’re seeing big revisions, like the shock downgrades to May/June’s US payrolls. Isolating trends is getting harder.

Secondly, there’s the supply side of the economy. It’s a woolly concept, admittedly. And it’s something policymakers didn’t have to worry about before the pandemic, when economies (Europe, particularly) weren’t exactly running at full capacity.

Since then, though, economies have been running hot. Supply chain disruption and worker shortages have taken on greater significance. But this stuff is hard to measure, so it’s no surprise there’s a range of views out there.

That said, there’s a growing acceptance that US immigration policy is putting limits on staffing availability. It’s why Chair Powell has said he is putting more weight on data like the unemployment rate, which theoretically does a better job of incorporating those supply constraints than payrolls.

Whether Powell still thinks that after July’s bombshell jobs numbers, time will tell. But unemployment has undoubtedly been more stable. So if you wanted to make an argument against a September rate cut – and there aren’t many right now – this is certainly one of them.

Another is inflation – the third source of active disagreement. Next (LON:) week’s US data is likely to be hot. James Knightley is expecting core CPI to come in at a punchy 0.4% month-on-month, which in annualised terms is consistent with almost 5% inflation. August’s data could be similar.

Now, there are very good reasons to think this tariff-driven spike won’t last, which James outlines below. I’d make similar arguments about the UK, which is ultimately why I still think the BoE will cut rates again in November, even if that call looks a shakier after this week’s meeting.

But the hawks at the Fed and BoE worry about a repeat of the infamous 2022 inflation spike. Officials in the UK have said that inflation is statistically more likely to become entrenched when headline reaches its current 3.5-4% level. The idea is that something changes in the psychology of households and businesses that makes inflation more likely to stick.

I’m not convinced, as I’ve explained before. But more importantly, I’m not sure the likes of the Fed or the BoE have the luxury of time to have these debates right now, given the omens emerging from the jobs market. What the UK and US – and many others, for that matter – have in common is the much longer lags involved with policy changes hitting the real economy. More prevalent fixed-rate lending has seen to that. The risk of falling behind the curve is real.

That means when the Fed does cut, it will probably do so quicker than many expect. We now think the Fed will cut rates in September, and a further four times by early 2026. That’s a more aggressive path than markets are pricing.

Still, my conclusion from everything I’ve said here – data uncertainty, changes to the Fed board, the inflation roller coaster – is that we’re in for a more volatile period of central bank expectations.

Every data point is taking on greater significance. There are two more inflation prints and one more jobs report before September’s Fed meeting, and each one will be a serious test of that market’s conviction in imminent rate cuts – even if that is probably the direction of travel.

Want to know more about that data and everything else to do with the Federal Reserve? Our webinar this coming Tuesday comes hot on the heels of those US inflation figures.

Chart of the Week: US Tariff Levels After Recent ’Trade Deals’

US Tariff Levels

Source: The White House, ING

THINK Ahead in Developed Markets

United States

Inflation (Tues): We saw some early evidence of the tariff impact in the June report, with core goods prices excluding autos rising 0.6%MoM, the biggest monthly increase since February 2022. We expect to see a similarly sized index rise this time, with autos likely to also contribute to a faster rate of inflation.

Vehicle prices surprisingly fell last in June despite the exposure to major tariff increases, while increases in car auction prices also add upside risk for the July reading. Consequently, we are forecasting a 0.4%MoM increase in , above the 0.3% consensus forecast.

We don’t think the Fed should worry about a repeat of 2021/22 when a supply-side shock led to inflation hitting 9%. Services dominate the inflation basket by weighting, and here the situation is very different to 2021/22. Remember that tripled over that period, house prices and housing rents surged, while the jobs market was red hot with desperate hiring practices resulting in record employee turnover as wages soared.

This all helped to amplify and extend the post-Covid supply-shock-related increase in goods prices. Today, these are all disinflationary influences, with cooling housing rents in particular set to help offset the effect of tariffs over the coming quarters.

/University of Michigan (Fri): Decent auto sales volumes should lift the headline sales figures, but weak consumer confidence figures due to anxiety over tariff-induced price hikes, worries about the state of the jobs market and volatility in household wealth mean activity will likely slow through the second half of the year.

United Kingdom (TADAWUL:)

Jobs report (Tues): The BoE was remarkably relaxed about the jobs market in its August decision, despite payroll employment having fallen gradually for several months now. Do we see another dramatic drop in those hiring numbers this month? It’s possible, though. Remember, these have a tendency of being revised up later.

(Thur): Like everywhere else, the numbers have been skewed by a surge in exports in Q1 as firms sought to get ahead of US tariffs. Q2 has unsurprisingly been weaker, but on average, activity still likely rose through the spring.

THINK Ahead in Central and Eastern Europe

Poland

Flash 2Q25 GDP (Wed): Despite a decline in construction output and continued weakness in industrial production growth, preliminary data suggest that GDP growth accelerated in the second quarter. Annual GDP growth is estimated at 3.5% YoY, up from 3.2% YoY in 1Q25. A notable driver was retail sales of goods, which surged to nearly 6% YoY, compared to just 1.4% YoY in the previous quarter, pointing to stronger momentum in private consumption.

June Current Account (Wed): We estimate a €1.1bn deficit in the June current account, which widened the 12-month cumulative external imbalance slightly to -1.1% of GDP, from -1.0% in May. However, the annual trade deficit remained broadly stable at 1.6% of GDP. Our forecasts show exports in euro terms rose 0.8% YoY, while imports increased 3.2% YoY.

Despite the widening imbalance, the current account position remains manageable and is not expected to threaten macroeconomic stability or the outlook for the PLN.

July CPI (Thu): Final figures should confirm that headline inflation remained above 3% YoY in July, with core inflation still elevated. Although CPI dropped significantly from 4.1% YoY in June to 3.1% YoY, we believe this decline is not enough to justify a 50bps rate cut as previously anticipated. Instead, we now expect a more gradual easing path, starting with a 25bps cut in September, followed by similar moves in October and November, bringing the NBP’s main policy rate to 4.25% by year-end.

Romania

July CPI (Tue): Following June’s higher-than-expected print, we expect to learn that inflation picked up to 6.4% in July, mostly due to energy prices, which are set to rise after the end of the electricity subsidy scheme. On the economic activity front, we foresee an almost stagnating GDP growth (2nd quarter, flash release), in line with the relatively muted activity seen so far in high-frequency indicators.

Czech Republic

July CPI (Mon): July’s preliminary estimate of headline inflation is likely to be confirmed by the Statistical Office, while the breakdown will show potent core inflation. Meanwhile, softer food price dynamics mitigated the overall inflation figure. The current account deficit is expected to have widened in June.

Key Events In Developed Markets Next Week

Key Events In Developed Markets Next Week

Source: Refinitiv, ING

Key Events in EMEA Next Week

Key Events in EMEA Next Week

Source: Refinitiv, ING

Disclaimer: This publication has been prepared by ING solely for information purposes irrespective of a particular user’s means, financial situation or investment objectives. The information does not constitute investment recommendation, and nor is it investment, legal or tax advice or an offer or solicitation to purchase or sell any financial instrument. Read more

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US Faces Stealth Fiscal Tightening as Tariffs Hit Corporate and Consumer Margins

Pay attention to what’s about to happen in the US.

The US is about to face a fiscal tightening over the next 3-4 months.

Yes, you read it correctly: a fiscal tightening.

How is this possible?

The US is set to receive $150bn of tariffs for the last 5 months of the year, which means US corporates and consumers will see their margins or their disposable income shrink the same way they would due to a new US tax.

At the same time, over the next 4-5 months there will be no noticeable fiscal impulse to offset this effect. The OBBB will only kick in 2026 with its (not even super large) fiscal stimulus offset.

The net result?

A fiscal tightening for the next 4-5 months.

Take a look at the charts below.

US Primary Deficit

The inflation-adjusted primary deficit spending in 2025 has amounted to 1.54% of , which is already below last year’s levels.

And if my theory on tariffs is correct, the primary deficit impulse will be materially lower than in 2023 and 2024.

How will the US economy handle such a fiscal tightening?

There are some initial signs of weakness emerging already…

***

This article was originally published on The Macro (BCBA:) Compass. Come join this vibrant community of macro investors, asset allocators and hedge funds – check out which subscription tier suits you the most using this link.

The Global Power Play Is Far From Over

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Fed’s Data Dependence May Risk Delayed Rate Cuts

For months, we have been warning that the labor markets are not as strong as the BLS data attests. Six months ago, we wrote:

While labor market data is generally good, there are signs the labor market is at a standstill. Continuing jobless claims are steadily rising and at their highest level in over three years. The JOLTS hires rate is at ten-year lows. While the number of layoffs remains low, employers aren’t hiring either.

Further, in early July, we wrote:

According to the ADP (NASDAQ:), June saw the largest decline in service sector payrolls (-66,000) since March 2020. While 52k of the losses came from education and healthcare, which tend to be seasonally volatile, the trend is poor. The current estimate for the BLS is +100k. ADP data argues we could get a surprise catch down (in regards to the coming BLS data). Stay tuned!

The point is not that we told you so. Much more importantly, we want to point out that the Fed appears to be data myopic. They over-rely on some data while seemingly ignoring other sources of data. Primarily, they seem to prefer government data on labor and .

Not only has government data proven unreliable at times, but in some cases, it is less robust. For instance, the BLS employment data is compiled via surveys, whereas uses actual paycheck data from its clients. Another example is Truflation, which uses 18 million price data points. Compare that to approximately 100,000 used in the BLS report.

The economic and market risk is that the “data-dependent” Fed is relying on faulty data. Thus, they may wait too long to , or not cut them enough to stave off a recession. To wit, they waited too long to raise rates and stop QE when inflation was starting to increase in 2021.

The graphs below show how ADP was ahead of the BLS, post-revisions, in predicting the decline in payroll growth.ADP vs BLS

Eli Lilly Stock Falls On Great Earnings

By all accounting measures, Eli Lilly (NYSE:) had a great quarter. The company had an EPS of $6.31, well above estimates of $5.57. Furthermore, its revenue came in about 5% above what Wall Street was expecting. Such was a 38% year-over-year increase. Recently, we have seen many companies report good earnings, but there has been a negative reaction by investors.

Often, that is a function of weaker-than-expected earnings guidance. However, for LLY, that was not the case. The company increased its revenue guidance by $2 billion and EPS by $1 a share. Below are a few quotes from its CEO, David Ricks:

Our strong results in the second quarter reflect the continued robust demand for our medicines, particularly in the cardiometabolic space with Mounjaro and Zepbound, as well as our oncology and immunology portfolios.

Right now, it’s really a kind of a golden era… the main priority we have is to keep our discovery engine rolling, make important medicines, and get them produced at scale.

The underlying business is super strong.

Along with earnings, the company reported promising FDA Phase 3 trials for its orally taken obesity drug Orforglipron. While great news, the stock fell. Investors were expecting the drug to result in a 15%+ weight loss in trials. The average weight loss was 12%.

Its chief competitor, Novo Nordisk (NYSE:), has shown its test users lost 15% on average using its oral GLP, which is also in Phase 3. NVO is opening higher on the LLY data. The graph below shows LLY has grossly outperformed NVO this year. This is in part because investors think LLY has advantages over NVO regarding obesity drugs.Eli Lilly-Daily Chart

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Debt and Deficits: Why Rising Numbers Aren’t Triggering a Financial Meltdown

In recent months, much debate has been about rising debt and increasing deficit levels in the U.S. For example, here is a recent headline from CNBC:Headlines

The article’s author suggests that U.S. federal deficits are ballooning, with spending surging due to the combined impact of tax cuts, expansive stimulus, and entitlement expenditures. Of course, with institutions like Yale, Wharton, and the CBO warning that this trend has pushed interest costs to new heights, now exceeding defense outlays, concerns about domestic solvency are rising. Even prominent figures in the media, from Larry Summers to Ray Dalio, argue that drastic action is urgently needed, otherwise another “financial crisis” is imminent.

The problem with Larry Summers’, Ray Dalio’s, and many others’ warnings of impending financial doom is that they have been warning of that very problem for decades. Such was the point of our previous discussion:

“It doesn’t take much to understand that Ray Dalio, a hedge fund titan, is like every other human being and is prone to error. I will not dismiss Dalio entirely, as his track record of managing money at Bridgewater is nothing to be scoffed at. However, his track record is far less enviable regarding debt crisis predictions. Here is a brief timeline.”

  • March 2015 – Hedge Funder Dalio Thinks the Fed Can Repeat 1937 All Over Again
  • January 2016 – The 75-Year Debt Supercycle Is Coming To An End
  • September 2018 – Ray Dalio Says The Economy Looks Like 1937 And A Downturn Is Coming In About Two Years
  • January 2019 – Ray Dalio Sees Significant Risk Of A US Recession
  • October 2022 – Dalio Warns Of Perfect Storm For The Economy (That was also the stock market low.)
  • September 2023 – Dalio Says The US Is Going To Have A Debt Crisis

But you can even go further back than these when he wrote about some of his biggest mistakes about a decade ago:

Here is the Problem for Investors

For investors who listened to Dalio’s predictions of a coming “depression” a decade ago, they missed participating in one of the most significant bull markets in U.S. history.Ray Dalio - Debt Crash Imminent

Yet over the past 40 years, the national debt has grown exponentially, with none of the dire consequences repeatedly predicted. Interest rates have fluctuated, political gridlock has persisted, and deficits have widened, but the U.S. economy continues to function, grow, and attract global capital. The reason is that the U.S. continues to enjoy what economists call the “exorbitant privilege” of being the issuer of the world’s reserve currency.

Treasuries remain the deepest, most liquid capital market globally, and the dollar is central to global trade, investment, and reserves. This creates a structural advantage that allows the U.S. to run larger deficits than other nations without facing the same level of market discipline. So long as global trust in U.S. institutions and the rule of law remains intact, there is a deep and steady demand for U.S. debt, providing a long runway before any severe funding stress emerges.

Moreover, deficit spending is no longer a temporary tool used in times of crisis; it has become an embedded feature of the economy. Social Security, Medicare, defense, and other entitlements are politically sacrosanct. At the same time, fiscal transfers (like tax credits and subsidies) are now a regular part of household consumption and corporate support. In many ways, the U.S. economy is now structurally reliant on deficit-financed stimulus. Growth, consumer spending, and even corporate investment increasingly depend on a steady stream of government outlays.

While U.S. debt and deficit levels are elevated, there is no imminent risk of fiscal collapse. However, it is worth examining the impact of rising debt and deficit levels on future economic prosperity.

The Real Problem With Debts and Deficits

I understand the concerns about rising debt levels. However, the problem of rising debt levels for the U.S. is NOT a default but a continued degradation of economic growth. Let’s start this discussion with a basic fact—without continued increases in debt, there would be very little to no economic growth.

This is because all government debt winds up in the economy and the household’s balance sheet through lending, credit, or direct payments. We can view this by looking at the dollars of debt required to create a dollar of economic growth. Since 1980, the increase in debt has usurped the entire economic growth. The problem with the growth in debt is that it diverts tax dollars away from productive investments into debt service and social welfare.

Debt Required to Generate $1 of GDP

Another way to view this is to consider “debt-free” economic growth. In other words, without debt, there has been no organic economic growth since 2015. Thus, the debt and subsequent deficits must continue to expand to sustain economic growth.

Real GDP Growth Ex-Debt

The economic deficit has never been more significant. From 1952 to 1982, the economic surplus fostered an economic growth rate averaging roughly 8%. Today, that is no longer the case as the debt detracts from growth. Such is why the Federal Reserve has found itself in a “liquidity trap” where:

Interest rates MUST remain low, and debt MUST grow faster than the economy, just to keep the economy from stalling out.

The problem with the current issuance of debt is that it is primarily non-productive debt. That is a crucially important concept concerning debt issuance and its impact on economic growth.

Non-Productive Debt Is The Problem

Not all debt is created equal. The key distinction lies between productive and non-productive debt, and understanding the difference is critical to evaluating the risks and benefits of government borrowing.

Productive debt refers to borrowing used for investments that generate long-term economic returns, such as infrastructure, education, research, or business capital expenditures. These types of investments can increase future , improve productivity, and ultimately pay for themselves through higher tax revenues.

In contrast, non-productive debt funds consumption or transfers that do not yield a measurable economic return. In the U.S., social welfare and interest payments on existing debt are a large majority of Government expenditures.

The data below shows that of every dollar spent by the Federal Government, roughly 73% is “mandatory” spending on social welfare and interest expense.Federal Spending

While the non-productive spending is necessary, primarily to support vulnerable populations, it adds to the debt burden without expanding the economy’s capacity to grow. The U.S., like many developed economies, increasingly relies on non-productive debt to sustain economic momentum, which raises concerns about long-term fiscal sustainability. The danger isn’t the debt itself; it’s when borrowed funds fail to create future value, leaving future taxpayers with the bill and no corresponding economic benefit.

Dr. Woody Brock’s book “American Gridlock” best explains the difference between productive and non-productive debt.

“The word “deficit” has no real meaning. Take a look at the following example:

Country A spends $4 Trillion with receipts of $3 Trillion. This leaves Country A with a $1 Trillion deficit. In order to make up the difference between the spending and the income, the Treasury must issue $1 Trillion in new debt. That new debt is used to cover the excess expenditures, but generates no income leaving a future hole that must be filled.

Country B spends $4 Trillion and receives $3 Trillion income. However, the $1 Trillion of excess, which was financed by debt, was invested into projects, infrastructure, that produced a positive rate of return. There is no deficit as the rate of return on the investment funds the “deficit” over time.

There is no disagreement about the need for government spending. The disagreement is with the abuse, and waste, of it.”

Currently, the U.S. is Country A. Increases in the national debt have long been squandered on increases in social welfare programs and, ultimately, higher debt service, which has an effective negative return on investment. Therefore, the larger the debt balance, the more economically destructive it is by diverting increasing amounts of dollars from productive assets to debt service.

But here is where the most essential concept to understand comes into play.

A Negative Multiplier

Excess “debt” has a zero-to-negative multiplier effect, as Economists Jones and De Rugy showed in a study by the Mercatus Center at George Mason University.

“The multiplier looks at the return in economic output when the government spends a dollar. If the multiplier is above one, it means that government spending draws in the private sector and generates more private consumer spending, private investment, and exports to foreign countries. If the multiplier is below one, the government spending crowds out the private sector, hence reducing it all.

The evidence suggests that government purchases probably reduce the size of the private sector as they increase the size of the government sector. On net, incomes grow, but privately produced incomes shrink.”

Personal consumption expenditures and business investment are vital inputs into the economic equation. As such, we should not ignore the reduction of privately produced incomes. Furthermore, according to the best available evidence, the study found:

“There are no realistic scenarios where the short-term benefit of stimulus is so large that the government spending pays for itself. In fact, the positive impact is small, and much smaller than economic textbooks suggest.”

Politicians spend money based on political ideologies rather than sound economic policy. Therefore, the findings should not surprise you. The conclusion of the study is most telling.

“If you think that the Federal Reserve’s current monetary policy is reasonably competent, then you actually shouldn’t expect the fiscal boost from all that spending to be large. In fact, it could be close to zero.

This is, of course, all before taking future taxes into account. When economists like Robert Barro and Charles Redlick studied the multiplier, they found once you account for future taxes required to pay for the spending, the multiplier could be negative.”

What should not surprise you is that non-productive debt does not create economic growth. As Stuart Sparks of Deutsche Bank (ETR:) noted previously:

“History teaches us that although investments in productive capacity can in principle raise potential growth and r* in such a way that the debt incurred to finance fiscal stimulus is paid down over time (r-git turns out that there is little evidence that it has ever been achieved in the past.

Rising federal debt as a percentage of GDP has historically been associated with declines in estimates of r* – the need to save to service debt depresses potential growth. The broad point is that aggressive spending is necessary, but not sufficient. Spending must be designed to raise productive capacity, potential growth, and r*. Absent true investment, public spending can lower r*, passively tightening for a fixed monetary stance.”

This is why the economic drag from a debt reduction would be devastating. The last time such a reversion occurred was during the Great Depression.Average Economic Growth by Cycle

Conclusion

This is one of the primary reasons why economic growth will continue to run at lower levels. Reversing non-productive spending is impossible due to the general population’s vast dependence on those programs. Reducing that spending would be “economic suicide.”

However, as noted in “Deficits May Find Their Cure In A.I.”

“From the deficit narrative perspective, this all suggests that the future is potentially much brighter than most imagine. The infrastructure buildout for AI data factories can drive economic growth by creating jobs, stimulating industries, and enabling AI-driven productivity gains. As noted above, increasing growth only marginally would stabilize the current debt-to-GDP ratio.

However, boosting GDP growth to 2.3%- 3% annually would vastly improve outcomes. Furthermore, if interest rates drop by just 1%, this could reduce spending by $500 billion annually, helping to ease fiscal pressures.”

While the U.S. faces a daunting fiscal outlook marked by rising debt and expanding deficits, the genuine concern is not an imminent crisis or default. Instead, the deeper, more structural issue is that an increasing share of federal borrowing is funneled into programs that support consumption but fail to generate future economic returns. That shift, which began over 50 years ago, creates a long-term drag on economic growth, crowds out private investment, and lowers the economy’s potential, or r*.

As the data and history show, debt to fund productive assets, like infrastructure, innovation, and education, can sustain growth and even pay for itself over time. But borrowing for entitlements and debt service does not. Unfortunately, the political and demographic realities make it nearly impossible to reverse course without severe economic fallout.

Unless policymakers redirect fiscal priorities toward investment in productive capacity, the economy will remain trapped in a cycle of low growth, rising obligations, and declining returns. Innovation may offer a way out, particularly the AI-driven transformation. If leveraged wisely, with targeted investment and smart policy, AI could lift productivity, restore growth, and ease the fiscal strain.

The path forward is narrow, but not closed, and not one of imminent financial crisis. However, the real challenge will be political will.

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Tariff Uncertainty, Tight Labor Market Complicate Fed Rate Cut Path

President Donald Trump on Thursday nominated Council of Economic Advisers Chairman Stephen Miran to serve out the remaining term of Federal Reserve Governor Adriana Kugler. Trump said Miran will serve in the role until January 31, 2026, while he continues a search for a permanent replacement. The Senate will probably confirm his nomination quickly and before the September meeting of the FOMC.

If so, then there could be at least three dissenters on the FOMC if the committee votes to pass on a cut in the federal funds rate (FFR) in September. They will argue that a weakening labor market justifies a . There might be a new group of dissenters if the Fed cuts the FFR. They might object that a rate cut risks heating inflation.

The current big debate is whether the weakness in Friday’s employment report reflects a labor market in which the demand for labor is weakening or whether there is a shortage of workers. It may be both at the same time.

On the demand side, Trump’s Tariff Turmoil (TTT) since April may have caused many employers to postpone their hiring plans until they were more certain of the impact of TTT on their businesses. If so, there should be less uncertainty about this now, and their hiring should resume. In this case, the Fed should hold off on cutting the FFR, and the dissenters will disagree.

In our opinion, the problem is mainly on the supply side of the labor market (chart). The labor force has stopped growing so far this year as a result of the Trump administration’s very effective closing of the border, as well as ongoing deportations. In this case, the Fed should also hold off on cutting the FFR since that would boost demand for workers, exacerbating the shortage of labor, which would put upward pressure on wage and price inflation rates.Labor Supply and Demand in US

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